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The diffusion and impact of the
corporation in 1910
By JAMES FOREMAN-PECK and LESLIE HANNAH*
With new and comprehensive data on the international spread of listed and unlisted
corporations before the First World War, this article shows the prominence of
common law and Scandinavian civil law in the process.This association is interpreted
as demonstrating the strong contribution of liberal (laissez-faire) industrial stances.
The findings confirm an extended version of Rajan and Zingales’s hypothesis that
trade and capital openness are necessary for companies to flourish. Despite the
possibilities that companies were created for fraud and exploitation, countries using
the corporate form more extensively before 1914 had higher GDP per capita.
Through this process, the benefit of imperialism extended to British dominions, but
not much, if at all, to British dependent colonies.
Mr Goldbury: Some seven men form an Association,
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets)
They start off with a public declaration
To what extent they mean to pay their debts . . .
Though a Rothschild you may be
In your own capacity,
As a Company you’ve come to utter sorrow—
But the Liquidators say,
‘Never mind—you needn’t pay’,
So you start another Company tomorrow! . . .
King: Well, at first sight it strikes us as dishonest,
But if it’s good enough for virtuous England—
The first commercial country in the world—
It’s good enough for us.
W. S. Gilbert and A. Sullivan, Utopia (Limited) orThe Flowers of Progress (1893)1
G ilbert and Sullivan’s low expectations for the globalization of the companies intheir day were reinforced two years later by the UK Comptroller-General for
Bankruptcies. His report complained that many joint-stock companies were liq-
uidated simply to defraud creditors.2 This pessimism about early corporate law is
echoed by many historians of Britain but contrasts starkly with pervasive
*Author Affiliations: James Foreman-Peck, Cardiff University; Leslie Hannah, London School of
Economics.
1 Gilbert and Sullivan, Utopia (Limited), pp. 33–4.
2 Board of Trade, 12th Annual Report, p. 6.
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Washington consensus triumphalism in which limited liability companies3 are a
key component of the financial development essential for economic growth.4 To
the extent that the spread of such organizations constitutes new industry entry,
they will foster competition and economic growth.5
In the terminology of Acemoglu and Robinson, companies are an economic
institution that might be extractive (according to Gilbert and Sullivan) or inclusive
(the common present-day view).6 When they are inclusive they allow wide partici-
pation by the population to make best use of their talents, fostering investment,
coordination, and efficiency. Extractive companies—suggested candidates have
included the East India Company, US Steel, and some investment bankers
today—expropriate resources from the rest of society, by fraud and misrepresen-
tation, by erecting entry barriers, by political lobbying, or by suppressing or
manipulating the functioning of markets. Extractive economic institutions are
typically formed or supported by extractive political institutions that concentrate
power in a narrow elite and place few limitations on their power.
To identify whether the corporation in 1910 was primarily an extractive or
inclusive institution, we consider the nature of the supply permitted by political
elites, governments, and potential lobbyists. In the supply of companies, the extent
of investor protection provided by national legal systems may play a role.7 The
advantages of common law have been a prominent centre of attention. In turn legal
practice or formulation could well be influenced by more deep-seated culture and
religion.8 However, political structures and pressure groups can be expected to try
to block company developments that impinge on incumbent interests, unless there
are countervailing inclusive institutions able to resist.9 Corporate regulation can be
‘captured’ by vested interests and company formation suppressed to prevent
competition.
Among the most prominent institutions that may have enhanced or detracted
from the operation of world markets before the First World War was the British
Empire, not least because almost all common law countries (with the notable
exception of the US) were members. If the Empire was a boon for markets it would
have stimulated both the international spread of companies and their contribution
to economic development. Companies therefore offer an opportunity to examine
the supposed extractive institutions of the British Empire, because a large propor-
tion of the countries for which data can be found were then members of the
Empire.10
3 We use the terms ‘corporation’ and ‘company’ interchangeably, ignoring legal niceties such as whether they
all had limited liability. Technically corporations can include some non-profit organizations such as universities
and municipalities (which we try to exclude) and the term ‘company’ was commonly used at the time (but is not
used here by us) to include partnerships (as is less common in British English today but remains the norm for
equivalents in many other languages).
4 Johnson, Making the market; Levine, ‘Financial development’; Rajan and Zingales, ‘Financial dependence’;
Sylla and Wright, ‘Corporation formation’, for triumphalism.
5 Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, ‘Entry regulation’.
6 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail.
7 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, ‘Law and finance’; Kuran, Long divergence; Klapper, Amit,
Guillén, and Quesada, ‘Entrepreneurship and firm formation’.
8 Stulz and Williamson, ‘Culture, openness, and finance’.
9 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversals’; Pagano and Volpin, ‘Political economy’.
10 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail; Accominotti, Flandreau, Rezzik, and Zumer, ‘Black man’s
burden’.
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The present exercise utilizes international company data for 1910 to estimate
what determines the supply of companies and to assess their impact on economic
development.11 With this new dataset, unprecedented in coverage, new light is cast
upon the institutional concomitants of economic development. An international
cross-section for a single year has some limitations for statistical inference.12 It
might be thought that a panel dataset would support more convincing results, but
panels must span a very lengthy period of time to capture country-level changes in
legal system, religion, or political system.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section I explains the essential
characteristics of the institution on which we focus. Section II describes the
bivariate relations between the stock of companies and the various possible con-
tributors to their supply. This approach allows us to maximize the number of
countries in the comparison. In section III regression analysis is used on a neces-
sarily more restricted dataset to decide the principal contributors to the supply of
companies.This section also establishes the GDP consequences of companies and
thereby calculates the net effect on GDP of exogenous influences—legal back-
ground, industrial policies, and the British Empire—nurturing or suppressing this
institution.
I
A company or a corporation is a ‘fuzzy’ concept. At the most general level it is a
grouping of persons collaborating to do what they cannot achieve so well sepa-
rately. In economic terms the boundaries between companies and other institu-
tions for production are not always perfectly clear but, we contend, they are clear
enough for operational purposes.
We ignore legal and contemporary niceties, using the modern terms corporation
and company loosely and interchangeably. Generally Hannah’s global corporate
data for 83 countries in 1910 (and hence ours) include all the capitalist organi-
zations known as corporations in the US or UK (in the latter they were more
commonly referred to as joint-stock companies) and their approximate foreign
language equivalents: sociétés anonymes in France, aktiebolag in Sweden, kabushiki
kaisha in Japan, and so on.13 In each case these included some public (often listed
or traded) and some private (close) companies. Therefore where there were sepa-
rate legal forms, approximately corresponding to public and private companies
(such as AGs and GmbHs in German-speaking countries), both are also
included.14 Some (generally small)15 wholly or partially limited liability entities,
such as sociétés en commandite (limited partnerships), are excluded, though we
follow contemporary statistical practice by including commandites with shares
(French sociétés en commandites par actions or German KGaAs), which tended to be
more like corporations.
11 Our sources and data are described in Hannah, ‘Global corporate census’, and more fully in its online
statistical appendixes.
12 Luintel, Khan, Arestis, and Theodoridis, ‘Financial structure’.
13 Hannah, ‘Global corporate census’.
14 As are Bergrechtiche Gewerkschaften, a modernized version of a medieval German multi-ownership form for
mines, common in German and Austrian heavy industry.
15 But not all: Solvay—the largest European chemical firm in 1910—had F40m capital but was then a simple
Belgian commandite partnership without shares, so is excluded.
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Such boundaries are definitionally fuzzy but though the available national
statistics do not always facilitate perfection, they have a rough and ready consist-
ency.16 The great majority of the organizations included had all, or most, of the
classic characteristics of corporate modernity, present in earlier centuries, but
substantially developed, standardized, and perfected during the nineteenth.These
included separate legal personality (allowing them to sue and be sued, own land,
and/or affix a seal in their own name), perpetual succession (facilitating, though
not guaranteeing, continuity even when shares pass by death or otherwise to new
owners),17 entity shielding (creditors could not pursue the company’s assets for
claims against individual shareholders),18 and limited liability (shareholders were
liable only for the amount they had subscribed).
Some companies had additional privileges: for example, the note issuing powers
of central banks (then investor-owned utilities) or the compulsory purchase (in
American English eminent domain) rights of railways. There is now a growing
literature emphasizing that the relative importance of these characteristics was not
the same in the nineteenth century as today,19 but by 1910 the world was already
well advanced on its modern trajectory. Limited liability, for example, was then a
clearly specified characteristic of the great majority of companies, but not of
absolutely all of them.20
Most companies in 1910 (by number) were private and unquoted (a few had
only one stockholder, many had only several),21 but most corporate capital by
value was quoted on stock exchanges or otherwise tradable. Listed companies
tended to be more widely held, many with thousands of stockholders, and already
several hundred companies numbered their holders in the tens of thousands. Rajan
and Zingales confine their discussion to such companies quoted on major
exchanges, implying, for example, that St Petersburg was quite close to the New
York Stock Exchange (in terms of such corporate values as a portion of GDP), but
the US had many more private companies than Russia, as our more inclusive
number and value statistics show.22 Hannah discusses the implications of adopting
even more expansive definitions of the company form, but most adjustments
would be marginal.The main exception would be the inclusion of all commandites,
on the grounds that, unlike most ordinary partnerships, they had partially limited
liability.23
II
The scheme that we explore in this section considers deep structural influences
upon the numbers of companies in a country: culture, law, and political regime.
These may have direct and indirect effects. The indirect effects include restrictive
16 For example, for some countries we necessarily follow national statistical practice by including some
incorporated non-capitalist organizations (mutual insurers, learned societies, and so on).
17 Blair, ‘Locking in capital’.
18 Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, ‘Law’.
19 Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes for legal protection’; Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor, Shareholder democ-
racies?
20 California had proportional rather than limited liability until 1932, and where there was a choice on
registration (as in Britain) a few companies chose to be unlimited; some banks had double or reserve liabilities.
21 Passow, Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung, pp. 223–4, gives the example of Krupp.
22 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversals’.
23 L. Hannah, ‘Organisational menus’ (unpub. working paper, still in progress).
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policies which have consequences for economic openness, especially foreign trade,
while foreign trade in turn may affect the density of companies. Ultimately we
want to specify a model that allows for companies either to raise or to lower GDP
per capita, and for numbers of companies to respond to the opportunities created
by higher national output and productivity. These relations are sketched in
figure 1. On the left are the deep structural variables that must be exogenous to
company numbers and other economic influences. On the right and in the centre
are variables that are likely to be determined simultaneously.
We extend Rajan and Zingales’s hypothesis, that trade and capital openness are
necessary for financial development and for listed public companies to flourish, to
all the companies covered by our sample.24 Incumbent interests are least able to
coordinate to obstruct or reverse the spread of companies when Rajan and
Zingales’s two conditions, openness to trade and high international capital mobil-
ity, are fulfilled. The year 1910 was a good year for international capital mobility,
but trade openness varied considerably. In figure 1 the hypothesis is represented by
the link from policy to companies and from exports to companies, perhaps through
policy.
Circumstances that allow incumbent interests to restrict foreign trade will also
permit them to block the development of domestic economic institutions; export-
orientation is greater the less these interests can repress competition originating
either at home or abroad. When imports are impeded to suppress competition,
domestic resources are diverted to supplying the home market and exports are cut
as well, if trade is to balance. After controlling for ‘natural’ influences upon
national trade openness—particularly the size of the country—trade intensity
reflects the extent to which vested interests are inhibiting development. However,
trade intensity is not necessarily the only appropriate measure of restrictive policies
adopted; the political system may be another. The bolder arrows in figure 1
indicate the relationships that we find most important later in this article. The
remainder of this section, with a series of tabulations, describes how the deep
structural variables are associated with the numbers of companies per capita and
the importance of corporate capital relative to GDP in different countries in 1910.
24 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversals’. The full dataset for our study is available in the online apps.
COMPANIES
Law
GDP per capita
PolicyPolitics
Culture
Exports/imports
Figure 1. Influences on and effects of companies in 1910
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Consideration is also given to the association of the variables with a measure of
‘capture’ by incumbent interests: exports per capita.
English common law, it is sometimes claimed, drives the development of good
institutions, including the corporation. This legal system supposedly is much
superior to French and German civil law systems in its supply of investor
protection, essential to avoiding ‘agency problems’ with joint-stock company
directors.25 However, factors that promote securitization (such as common law
rights of shareholders or anti-director rights) may have ambiguous effects on
corporatization, particularly as measured by the numbers of companies. Weak
disclosure requirements or shareholder rights may inhibit stock market initial
public offering but encourage use of the close corporation, especially in countries
where private companies were not exempted from stringent public company
regulations.26
We adopt non-European (for example, Islamic) law and mixed systems as the
base case and distinguish from this the four categories of Scandinavian, French,
and German civil law, and common law systems. Although England andWales and
many British colonies adhered to the common law tradition, the Scots and French
Canadians were different. Nonetheless we count the UK and Canada as common
law countries.27 We do the same for Indian Native States (which used India’s
company law) and Gambia (because most of its five companies were formed under
British law). Matching the company data with common law yields a sample of 21
countries.28 Of these in 1910 only one is not British, the US (table 1).29 Clearly
English common law and Scandinavian civil law countries were far more fecund in
companies than the rest; apparently civil law per se was not harmful to the spread
of the corporation because the Scandinavians were able to generate far more
companies per capita than common law countries.
25 La Porta et al., ‘Law and finance’.
26 For example, in Germany AGs (public companies) were required to appoint an Aufsichtsrat (supervisory
board) and publish accounts, but GmbHs (private companies) were exempt from these requirements; Parisius
and Crüger, Das Reichgesetz, pp. 20–3.
27 But not Malta, which retained civil law, despite membership of the British Empire.
28 US, UK, Uganda, Straits Settlements, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Rhodesia, Nigeria, Newfoundland, New
Zealand, Kenya, Hong Kong, Gambia, Gold Coast, Gibraltar, Federated Malay States, Ceylon, Canada, British
India, Indian Native States, and Australia.
29 Adding up the bracketed figures in col. 1, tab. 1 shows that there are 83 countries in the legal system/
company numbers comparison. In contrast there are only 34 countries for which a stock value/legal system
comparison can be made.
Table 1. Regulatory capture, law, and the spread of companies, c. 1910
Companies/population
(no. of countries)
Corporate stock value at par/
GDP% (no. of countries)
Exports per capita (US$
1913) (no. of countries)
Common law 662* (21) 156* (8) 48* (19)
Scandinavian civil law 1,285* (4) 49 (4) 41 (4)
French civil law 159 (24) 44 (12) 30 (22)
German civil law 103 (10) 32 (7) 10 (9)
Others 147* (24) 25 (3) 18 (8)
Notes: *Significantly different from sample mean at 5% level. These mean values are not weighted by the no. of companies in a
country.
Sources: League of Nations, Memorandum, p. 150, tab. VIII, and see n. 11.
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On the other hand Scandinavian civil law companies were on average smaller in
relation to GDP than those in common law countries. They were little different
from those in French civil law countries, but both were more dominant in the
economy than corporations in German civil law countries. At first sight common
law countries appear to encourage corporatization (table 1)—though what this
contributed to economic growth and development in 1910 remains to be
demonstrated.
Under a civil law system, Norway seems to have developed effective corporate
governance without any statutory corporate law.30 Norway had more corporations
per head of population in 1910 than any European country.31 Substantial protec-
tions were available to minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate
‘insiders’. By contrast, Islamic law, it has been contended, was especially harmful
for development.32 We may also note that if common law really did promote the
spread of companies, and companies stimulated economic growth, we would
expect to find an impact of common law on economic development. A natural
experiment in South Africa casts doubt on whether such an effect can be
found.33
Both common law countries and Scandinavian law are associated with company
intensiveness, but what does the correlation signify? Most countries had corpora-
tion statutes or commercial codes, so the common/civil law difference lay only in
the extent to which judges could modify laws by applying general principles as
opposed to simply interpreting the statute. These two categories therefore prob-
ably identify nations that adopted ‘hands off’, liberal, or permissive industrial
policy, in contrast to those that were highly regulatory (France/Germany) or
entirely repressive (some independent poor countries).The colons in Saigon some-
times sadly compared their situation with that of British colonists who were
neighbours of Indochina.34 Scandinavian and common law countries pursued
generally liberal industrial policies, and this seems to have permitted relatively
abundant company formation.35 Such an interpretation is supported especially if
the highly regulatory systems were more prone to capture. Consistent with the
Rajan and Zingales hypothesis, French civil law and German civil law countries
achieved lower exports per capita than the liberal economies (table 1).36
Potentially the date of general incorporation legislation is a determinant of the
level of corporatization. Except in the case of major wars and revolutions and brief
retreats in severe depressions, the annual number of corporate births consistently
exceeds the number of corporate deaths in all nations, so an obvious variable to
include in a model is the date at which incorporation became easy and normal. For
many advanced countries (most US states, the UK, France, and Germany) and
some others (India, Hong Kong, and Orange Free State) this came with general
registration laws (eliminating the need for individual legislative or executive
approval) in the period 1840–70, while for others (Russia, Thailand, and Greece)
30 Ostergaard and Smith, ‘Corporate governance’.
31 Hannah, ‘Global corporate census’, p. 11, tab. 3.
32 Kuran, Long divergence.
33 Brunt, ‘Property rights’.
34 Bulletin Financier de l’Indochine, 26 Dec., no. 19 (1910).
35 Frankema, ‘Origins of formal education’, shows the strengths and weaknesses of what a ‘liberal’ policy meant
in practice for the adjacent field of education in sub-Saharan Africa before 1940.
36 League of Nations, Memorandum, p. 150, tab. VII.
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even as late as 1910 such liberality still remained in the future. Unfortunately, a
date of general incorporation variable proves difficult to define across all countries
(early registration statutes were often not truly general but restricted to single
industries, small firms, or small sub-national areas) and more relevant in some
countries than others. In Germany incorporation by simple registration in 1870
led to a substantial increase, as again did its 1892 statute introducing simpler
GmbH incorporations. By contrast in the US and UK promiscuous company
formation pre-dated simplified registration laws, which therefore less noticeably
accelerated what was a more continuously increasing flow of incorporation.37
General registration dates may have been endogenous to the process of economic
development and not exogenous, like legal systems and, perhaps, policy styles.
Possible influences on company numbers include prohibitions of incorporation
for certain categories (lawyers, retail shops), or of firms below a certain size. Other
discouragements of incorporation were discriminatory taxation, high registration
fees, and compulsory notarization. However, the variety of such constraints, and
the fact that they were not always incorporated in accessible legislation or codes,
make it difficult to summarize them quantitatively.38 We do not doubt that such
variables had some impact on the level of corporatization, so to the extent that
such deterrents are not proxied by our measures for ‘liberalization’, our model may
be under-specified.
National legal traditions relate the legal system to the culture of which they are
a partial expression. Hence Stulz and Williamson maintain that differences in
culture, proxied by divergences in religion and language, influence why investor
protection differs across countries.39 We examine whether a similar phenomenon
affected the spread of corporations by considering official religions for 1910.40
These religions are not necessarily representative of the populations’ practices and
beliefs; for instance, many colonies, the US, and the Netherlands are recorded as
‘secular’. Finland was predominantly Lutheran in 1900, but as a part of the
Russian Empire this was not the official religion. Similarly the Dutch East Indies
(present-day Indonesia) are for 1900 recorded with an official religion of the
Dutch Reformed Church despite the great majority of the inhabitants adhering to
Islam. However, if a narrow elite shaped economic institutions, as well as choosing
the official religion, then it may be the official religion that matters for predicting
economic institutions, and thus performance.
Secular economies were significantly more open than the average in 1910, and
they were significantly more corporation-intensive and dominated by corporations
(par value as percentage of GDP) (table 2). Official Protestants, classified as
Anglicans plus Lutherans in table 2—in conformity with Stulz and
Williamson—were corporation-intensive and Islam and Roman Catholicism were
not. However, common and Scandinavian law completely overlap the Protestant
category. Roman Catholic countries, like Islamic and ‘others’, were relatively
closed economies.
37 See Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Extreme divorce’, p. 1221, for the UK; compare the decadal foundation
data for 1909 German AGs in Kaiserlichen Statistische Amte, Statistisches Jahrbuch, p. 406.
38 More generally substitutes for legal protection may have facilitated the growth in the numbers of corpora-
tions in some countries; Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes for legal protection’.
39 Stulz and Williamson, ‘Culture, openness, and finance’.
40 Barrett, World Christian encyclopedia.
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Political economy considerations in recent times have suggested that
majoritarian democratic constitutions may provide more investor protection—and
therefore more investment in joint-stock companies—than proportional represen-
tation.41 Only a few countries had adopted proportional representation in 1910,
and so Pagano andVolpin’s representation hypothesis arguably is less relevant than
a century later. Here we focus simply on the degree of democracy as defined by the
Polity IV index.42 This index of democracy–autocracy measures regime authority
on a 21-point scale ranging from −10 (hereditary monarchy without parliamentary
constraint) to +10 (consolidated democracy).The index constructors also recom-
mend a three-part categorization of ‘autocracies’ (−10 to −6), ‘anocracies’43 (−5 to
+5), and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10). Six countries in the present sample receive a
score of +10 and are classified as perfectly functioning or ‘consolidated’ democ-
racies in 1910. They are the US, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
and Greece.To increase the coverage of the index, we assume an index number of
−6 for colonies otherwise not included.
Table 3 shows that democracy and consolidated democracy were clearly asso-
ciated with high corporate numbers and with a high corporate capital to GDP
ratio. Autocracies were linked with significantly low corporate numbers, but their
average ratio of corporate capital to GDP was not much lower than that for
consolidated democracies. The most open countries measured by exports per
capita were democracies.
41 Pagano and Volpin, ‘Political economy’.
42 Polity IV Project.
43 An ‘anocracy’ is generally a regime where power is vested in elite groups constantly competing for power,
rather than in public institutions.
Table 2. Religion and regulatory capture c. 1910
Companies/population
(no. of countries)
Corporate stock value at par/
GDP % (no. of countries)
Exports per capita
(no. of countries)
Roman Catholic 124 (13) 52 (4) 26 (12)
Secular 613* (20) 163* (7) 51.4* (16)
‘Protestant’ 1,434* (5) 70 (5) 54.7 (5)
Islamic 72 (8) 25 (2) 20.4 (6)
Other 156* (37) 33* (16) 19.7 (23)
Note: *Significantly different from sample mean at the 5% level.
Sources: Barrett, World Christian encyclopedia, and as for tab. 1.
Table 3. Politics and regulatory capture c. 1910
Corporations per million
population (no. countries)
Corporate stock value at par/
GDP% (no. of countries)
Exports per capita
(no. of countries)
Autocracy (includes colonies) 133* (46) 69.6 (10) 23.9 (28)
Anocracy 271 (22) 49.0 (13) 35.1 (19)
Democracy 1,131* (13) 86.5 (11) 47.9 (13)
‘Consolidated democracy’ 1,586* (6) 76.8 (5) 51.1 (6)
Notes: *Significantly different from sample mean at 5% level. ‘Consolidated democracy’ is included in the ‘Democracy’ category.
Sources: Polity IV Project; and as for tab. 1.
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In the world of 1910, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, the imperial
framework ensured that ‘extractive institutions’ were adopted where Europeans
did not settle.44 Allegedly administrators there cared little about aggregate output
or the welfare of the indigenous population. Davis and Huttenback’s classification
of British self-governing colonies correspond with ‘good institution’ colonies
(dominions) while dependent colonies and India coincided with ‘extractive insti-
tution’ colonies.45 In this dependent British Empire, where coercion was available,
it has been contended that European institutions and ideals were ignored. The
spread or otherwise of the joint-stock company to such regions offers a test of these
views. We can use the corporations data to provide a simple test of Accominotti
et al.’s hypothesis of British Empire repression of non-European settled areas.46 If
indigenously registered joint-stock companies reflect ‘good’ or ‘inclusive’ institu-
tions, then corporations per capita is a measure of institutional ‘progress’.
Our specification of the Accominotti et al. hypothesis requires that joint-stock
companies were more abundant in European settled regions and less abundant
elsewhere in the Empire. This is of course a simple minded test because other
relevant factors may differ between regions—in particular productivity, GDP, and
proportion of agriculture—but it is a start.
Indigenous ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for companies to be
inclusive institutions, but may be an indication nonetheless. In India, the cotton
mill industry was largely in the hands of Indians, and the greater proportion of
paid-up capital among Indian registered companies was in cotton and other mills
and presses, concentrated in Bombay.47 The density of companies in India (at 12
per million population) was far higher than China’s.48 British India’s ratio of equity
capital at par to GDP of 24 per cent compares with Austria’s 26 per cent and
Spain’s 27 per cent.
The corporation-intensiveness of Hong Kong, a non-European settler area with
1,320 companies per million compared with a sample average of 338 and a UK
figure of 1,241, also seems unlikely to have been possible without some native
participation. The Hong Kong population was of course small so that the 577
companies recorded yield a very high ‘density’.49 However, judging from the names
of individual corporate liquidations in the Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong
Kong company registration was not just used by the small numbers of the colonial
44 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail. Some writers contend that the British were extractive even in
dominions; Sylla, ‘Political economy’; McQueen, ‘Company law’.
45 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon; Accominotti et al., ‘Black man’s burden’. South Africa, a dominion in
1910, is somewhat problematic because Acemoglu and Robinson identify it as ‘extractive’, but it was self-
governing and less extractive than it was to become. In 1961 miners’ wages were 12% lower than they had been
in 1911; Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, p. 268.
46 Accominotti et al., ‘Black man’s burden’.
47 Moral and Material Progress (P.P. 1912–13, XLVII), p. 60.
48 An illustration of India’s lead is the Tata Iron and Steel Company which was formed in 1907 ‘with a large
capital’ and began work early in 1912; ibid., p. 57.
49 German SouthWest Africa (modern Namibia) casts a contrasting light to Hong Kong. Here there were a few
European settlers backed up by substantial armed force exercised against the indigenous inhabitants. The 116
companies in South West Africa were apparently exclusively formed by Europeans. The colony illustrates the
difficulty of using population as the denominator in countries where the native population hardly participated in
the modern sector at all. In the deserts of South West Africa, the native population was tiny. It is essentially the
denominator, rather than the numerator, that creates the impression of much greater use of the corporate form
in South West Africa, where the corporate density was higher than in Germany itself.
10 JAMES FOREMAN-PECK AND LESLIE HANNAH
© Economic History Society 2014 Economic History Review (2014)
white business elite but also by the native Chinese bourgeoisie.50 Prosperous
examples can be found both in Hong Kong (for example, Kwong Hip Lung, the
Kowloon engineers and shipbuilders registered in 1890) and in mainland China
(for example, Nanyang Brothers Tobacco and Lao Kung Mao, Shanghai cotton
spinners). Hong Kong registrations were even utilized by companies operating in
Japan (for example, Kirin Beer until 1907) and elsewhere in Asia.51
The Federated Malay States’ Mines Department Reports mention numerous
corporate tin mines mainly owned by ethnic Europeans and Chinese.52 The initial
impression then is that the British administration of law and order created a more
favourable environment for corporate development in the colonies—not exclu-
sively for Europeans—than did the surrounding states. But the consequences of
such development remain to be demonstrated.
Consistent with the Accominotti et al. hypothesis, table 4 shows first that British
Empire areas controlled by European settlers were significantly more corporation-
intensive than the rest of the sample average, though on average a little less than
the UK. The six countries involved were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, New-
foundland, South Africa, and Rhodesia. The inclusion of the last two might be
contested—Rhodesia only acquired effective dominion status in 1923—but the
critical element of the Accominotti et al. theory is a substantial body of Europeans
in a strong position to bargain. Not consistent with the hypothesis is that, although
the British Empire regions not extensively settled by Europeans had a lower mean
number of companies than the rest of the world, the difference is statistically
insignificant and the mean is far higher than for independent poor countries. For
comparison, French and German colonial averages are included. The French
average is much lower than the rest of the world, significant on a one-tailed test at
the 5 per cent level, and the figure for France itself (306) is also lower than the rest
of the world. The German average is buoyed up by South West Africa.53
The mean corporate stock value at par as a percentage of GDP for the four
British Empire European settler countries for which we have data was 103 per cent
compared with 162 per cent for the UK. For only two British ‘colonies’ with an
50 For example, on 7 Jan. 1910, among the 14 companies that the Gazette announced dissolved were the Heng
Fung Flour Mill, the Man Ying Land Investment and Agency, the Hoi Sun Printing and Publishing, the Tung
Sang Yu Newchwang Bean Oil Manufacturing, the Sing On Steamship, and the Kwong Shun Steam Boat
companies; Gazette, 7 Jan. 1910, p. 29.
51 Wright, ed., Twentieth century impressions, pp. 196–249; Lee, ‘Chinese merchants’; Chung, Chinese business
groups, pp. 53–5, 171.
52 Federated Malay States Mines Department, Report.
53 See above, n. 48.
Table 4. British Empire corporatization in 1910 versus the rest
Companies per million pop (no. of countries)
British Empire—European settlers control 1,207* (6)
British Empire—indigenous majority 196 (13)
French colonies 44 (11)
German colonies 279 (6)
Independent poor countries 15 (8)
Notes: *Significantly different from sample mean at 5% level. ‘Independent poor’ defined as under $900 in 1913 GDP per capita
as in Maddison, ‘Statistics on world population’: Afghanistan, Brazil, China, Columbia, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nepal, and Siam.
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indigenous majority do we have ratios of share capital to GDP, India and Hong
Kong. Between them they average 252 per cent, which might be interpreted either
from the triumphalist viewpoint as the substantial benefits of empire, or from
Gilbert and Sullivan’s position as a sign of exploitative foreign capital in enclave
economies. But the ratio is sharply dichotomous: Hong Kong’s 480 per cent hardly
compares with India’s 24 per cent.
Bivariate associations among ‘fundamental’ variables thus suggest that some
combination of democracy, Protestantism, common or Scandinavian civil law, and
being a European settler British Empire country provided the conditions for
maximum corporatization. All top scorers on the companies per million popula-
tion indicator (the US, Canada, and Norway) have three or four of these charac-
teristics and other countries that have them are not far behind (New Zealand and
Australia).
Whereas culture, law, and politics can reasonably be regarded as exogenous to
corporatization, trade may be simultaneously determined with it; descriptive asso-
ciations are therefore less likely to indicate causation. If political and economic
elites restrict competition from imports then resources will be diverted to substi-
tute domestic production away from exports. Consistent with their theory, Rajan
and Zingales find a positive correlation of trade volume/GDP with publicly listed
companies for 1913.54 Similarly our figure 2, with a much larger sample, shows a
close relationship between more general corporatization and export intensity (per
capita) in this period of high capital mobility.55 The figure is consistent with
interest groups blocking new competition in more closed economies, but also
accords with other hypotheses.These include the beneficial effects on productivity
and international competitiveness of more companies, and the usefulness of the
corporate form for trade over longer distances.
III
To go beyond simple association and establish the nature of the interplay between
the variables we have been considering, we use a three equation formal model.The
stock of companies (C) in a country i might depend on many variables; including
culture/religion, law, and politics (all Z1 in equation 1 below); it is likely to increase
as income (Y) expands demand and with exports (X), whether because companies
are set up to export or because greater trade intensity limits regulatory capture.
C X Y Zi i i i i= + + + + …α α α α ε0 1 2 3 1 1 (1)
Capture of trade policy may be measured by lower exports (X) as a response to
trade barriers or restrictive practices. However, export intensity is likely to depend
on other factors—such as the size of the economy. Smaller countries, measured by
population (Pop) and income or GDP per capita (Y), normally trade more relative
to GDP.When corporations were as beneficial as western triumphalism indicates,
54 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversals’.
55 In fig. 2 the US is an important outlier which, since it accounts for more than 55% of global corporations
in 1910, might be considered troubling. However, we must recognize that more than one variable influences the
density of companies. The US was extraordinarily liberal in chartering companies and internal commercial
regulation while being extremely protectionist in trade policy.
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then more corporations should have permitted or stimulated greater exports, as in
equation 2 with β1 > 0. Other institutional or political factors are included in Z2.
X C Pop Y Zi i i i i i= + + + + + …β β β β β ε0 1 2 3 4 2 2 (2)
If corporations were important contributors to economic well-being, they would
influence an economy through the volume and productivity of the savings that they
transform into investment and future output. This in turn would raise long-run
national income or output per capita, Y, in which case in equation 3 γ1 > 0.
56 In
addition to the channelling of capital to productive uses, human capital is widely
believed to matter for utilizing equipment efficiently.The best measure we have for
a wide range of countries in 1910 is literacy (Lit). All other measurable influences
are covered by Z3.
Y C Lit Zi i i i i= + + + + …γ γ γ γ ε0 1 2 3 3 3 (3)
In the above equations ε1 . . . ε3 are independent, normally distributed random
disturbance terms with zero means.
56 With this model we cannot say anything about induced changes in income distribution, which is also
potentially relevant to assessing the contribution of companies.
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Figure 2. Exports and the international spread of companies, c. 1910
Sources: League of Nations, Memorandum, p. 150, tab. VIII, and see n. 11.
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Matching all the variables specified in the model across countries restricts the
number of economies that can be considered to a minimum of 51, using the
Maddison GDP figures.57 This means our British colony cases are restricted to
Ceylon, Malaya, Gold Coast, India, and Straits Settlements. However, the repre-
sentation of Africa can be increased by utilising Prados de la Escosura’s GDP
estimates.58 These allow us to include Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda in the
corporations and export equations (1 and 2) as well, shifting the centre of colonial
gravity away from Asia.The colonial results accordingly are somewhat sensitive to
the two variables. The complete dataset can be found in online appendix S1.
Consistent estimates of the coefficients of this model require that the error terms
of the estimating equations be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If
equations 1, 2, and 3 are, in practice, simultaneously determined (all coefficients
are non-zero), this condition will not be fulfilled.We therefore adopt instrumental
variable methods, with both single equation (two-stage least squares, 2SLS) and
system (three-stage least squares, 3SLS) estimates.
Table 5 displays estimates of model equation (1). At around 80 per cent the
explained variances of the equations are high for international cross-section data,
indicating that systematic explanation of the international spread of companies in
1910 is quite complete. Equation 5.1, estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS),
covers 51 countries. The apparent GDP elasticity is a little above unity and
statistically significant, while the export elasticity is less than half of the GDP
elasticity. Scandinavian civil law shows a consistently high propensity to host
companies even when incomes and exports are controlled. The propensity is
considerably higher than that indicated by the nonetheless large and significant
common law countries’ coefficient.That they are both important influences on the
stocks of companies despite different legal systems suggests a common factor
between these two groups of countries other than the legal system.The likely factor
is the ease with which companies could be created, in contrast to French and
German civil law countries or independent poor economies (none of these vari-
ables were significant at the 5 per cent level when included in the OLS model,
equation 5.2). Surprisingly, no other bivariate association of section 2 (political
regime, official religion) is generally statistically significant (equations 5.3, 5.4).
Instrumenting of GDP and exports is undertaken with equation 5.5.59 In fact the
coefficients differ little from the OLS estimates of equation 5.1.
To test our version of the Accominotti et al. hypothesis, indicators of British
dominion or colony status are added in equation 5.6. The negative British colony
coefficient is almost exactly cancelled out by the positive common law coefficient.
This suggests that these colonies were neither precocious nor backward in forming
companies; the advantages of common law or liberal regimes were offset by the
disadvantages of colonial status, once the effects of GDP and exports have been
controlled. Dominion status, on the other hand, conferred the advantages of
common law or a liberal regime without other disadvantages.
57 Maddison, ‘Statistics on world population’.
58 Prados de la Escosura, ‘Pre-independence Africa’, tab. B3, p. 36.
59 Instruments are the log of population, consolidated democracy, literacy, and the official religion of Islam.
Hansen’s J-statistic is consistent with instrument validity, the absence of correlation with unmeasured determi-
nants of the spread of corporations, and the KP LM statistic is highly significant in rejecting the null of
under-identification.The weak identification statistic indicates that the instrumented variable coefficients may be
only slightly biased (between 5 and 10% maximal relative bias).
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Table 5. Determinants of the international spread of (log) corporations in 1910
Estimation
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Ln GDP per capita (ly) 1.223*** 1.200*** 1.213*** 0.870** 1.268*** 0.844** 1
(5.69) (4.90) (4.87) (3.06) (4.53) (2.77) (imposed)
Export intensity (lx) 0.530*** 0.575*** 0.525** 0.584*** 0.655*** 0.806*** 0.600***
(4.00) (4.22) (3.48) (4.53) (3.45) (4.18) (6.45)
Scandinavian civil law 1.687*** 1.995*** 1.781*** 1.731*** 1.499*** 1.574*** 1.759***
(4.89) (4.55) (4.92) (5.72) (4.41) (5.11) (5.35)
Common law 0.982** 1.283** 0.714* 0.937** 0.804** 1.581** 1.660**
(3.33) (3.24) (2.28) (3.17) (2.64) (2.90) (3.33)
French civil law 0.259
(0.73)
German civil law 0.742
(1.88)
Independent poor 0.105
(0.20)
Roman Catholic 0.0210
(0.06)
Secular 0.654
(1.56)
Islamic 0.0273
(0.06)
Democracy 0.282
(0.93)
Autocracy −0.344
(−0.99)
Consolidated democracy 0.244
(0.97)
British dominion −0.373 −0.195
(−0.62) (−0.35)
British colony −1.499* −1.329*
(−2.17) (−2.53)
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
R2 0.825 0.837 0.839 0.837 0.817 0.835 0.722
Instrumented ly, lx ly, lx
Excluded exogenous Literacy, consolidated democracy,
Islam, population
Weak id. statistic 11.53 9.424
Id. statistic (prob.) 9.595 (0.022) 10.47 (0.015)
Hansen’s J statistic (prob.) 2.761 (0.251) 1.537 (0.464)
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of exports indicated that the null of exogeneity
could not be rejected.60 Then, since the unconstrained elasticity is not significantly
different from one, a unit elasticity may be imposed on GDP per capita and the
company equations estimated by OLS (5.7). Equation 5.7 confirms the result that
export elasticity is about 0.6 and the common law and British colony coefficients
are about equal and opposite. According to Rajan and Zingales’s hypothesis, the
responsiveness of company numbers to exports reflects the reduced chances in a
more open economy for agreements in restraint of trade. However, as noted above,
there are other—not mutually exclusive—explanations, for the association.
Re-estimating table 5 with the three extra African observations does not affect the
coefficient estimate significantly (the British colony coefficients are −1.580 and
−1.446 in the last two equations).
Estimates of model equation 2 are in table 6. If, as suggested in the preceding
paragraph, exports are exogenous to companies, then companies should not be a
significant influence on exports and the coefficient on companies in an OLS
exports regression (such as 6.1) will reflect reverse causation. Instrumenting
should render the coefficient small and insignificantly different from zero, as is
apparent in equations 6.2 and 6.4. In model equation 2, β1 can be regarded as
zero.
The income elasticity of exports is significantly greater than one, once company
numbers has been dropped from the specification (6.3 and 6.5). The population
control for ‘natural openness’ has the expected highly significant negative sign in
all export equations. All equations show that, after controlling for population and
GDP, British colonies are significantly export-orientated, unlike dominions. Con-
solidated democracies are significantly averse to exporting (equations 6.4–6.6)
which, bearing in mind the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis, may imply that these
polities are especially prone to special interest lobbying. A corollary may be that
the opposite was true of British colonies.The coefficient of 1.11 on British colonies
in 6.5 and 6.6 implies that they exported 200 per cent more than did other
jurisdictions (exp(1.11) −1)*100). This result is reversed by adding in the three
African colonies by using the Prados de la Escosura GDP series (equation 6.7); the
larger British colonies group are no longer statistically significant exporters after
GDP and population have been controlled. One reason may be that the African
colonies were recent acquisitions compared with India, Ceylon, and the Straits
Settlements and the full export effects of colonial administration had not yet
transpired.
Table 7 contains estimates of versions of equation 3 of the model. Corporations
and literacy are highly significantly associated with GDP in all of them. Equation
7.1 combines the basic specification with legal systems and shows that Scandina-
vian and German civil law have adverse impacts on income. While the second
variable sign is consistent with the excessively repressive operation of German legal
influenced administrations, the first suggests the Scandinavian liberal legal tradi-
tion may have erred in the opposite direction. In equation 7.2, unlike ‘consolidated
democracy’ or ‘autocracy’, ‘democracy’ exercises a statistically significant effect on
GDP but in equation 7.3 a selection of religious variables do not. (When ‘democ-
60 Using as instruments log of population and literacy for log export intensity in specification 5.5; H0: regressor
is exogenous; Wu–Hausman F test: 0.80789 F(1,45) p-value = 0.37353; Durbin–Wu–Hausman chi-sq test:
0.89946 chi-sq(1) p-value = 0.34293.
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Table 6. Determinants of (log) export intensity
Estimation
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Ln GDP per capita (ly) 0.989*** 1.364** 1.406*** 1.329*** 1.537*** 1.539*** 1.610***
(3.88) (3.10) (8.99) (3.49) (10.00) (10.97) (11.25)
Ln corporations (lc) 0.210* 0.0175 0.0871
(2.47) (0.13) (0.72)
Ln population (lpop) −0.270*** −0.329*** −0.334*** −0.323*** −0.348*** −0.348*** −0.347***
(−4.39) (−4.61) (−6.27) (−5.60) (−7.01) (−6.61) (−6.12)
British colony 0.973** 1.112** 1.129** 1.033** 1.115*** 1.116** 0.493
(2.84) (3.02) (3.27) (3.03) (3.39) (3.15) (1.29)
British dominion 0.0164 0.240 0.256 0.349 0.428 0.427 0.239
(0.05) (0.60) (0.57) (1.02) (1.02) (0.95) (0.88)
Consolidated democracy −0.689*** −0.696** −0.698** −0.669**
(−3.33) (−2.90) (−2.89) (−3.15)
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 54
R2 0.811 0.791 0.787 0.825 0.809 0.809 0.782
Instrumented lc ly lc lc ly ly ly (Prados extended)
Excluded exogenous Common law, Scandinavian civil law, literacy As in 6.2–6.5
Weak id. statistic 5.992 142.2 5.672 108.1 101.5
Id. statistic 8.165 24.17 8.864 21.69 21.88
Id. prob. 0.0169 0.0000231 0.0119 0.0000758 0.0000692
Hansen’s J statistic 0.113 0.113 0.866 1.146 0.690
J statistic prob. 0.737 0.945 0.352 0.564 0.708
Notes: Constants included but not reported. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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Table 7. Determinants of (log) GDP per capita
Estimation
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6)a (7.7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Ln corporations (lc) 0.133*** 0.114*** 0.131*** 0.0948*** 0.131*** 0.144***
(5.17) (4.64) (4.76) (3.57) (4.18) (3.39)
Literacy 0.0148*** 0.0123*** 0.0147*** 0.0162*** 0.0144*** 0.0149*** 0.0189***
(11.25) (7.25) (9.28) (12.63) (8.51) (6.80) (11.05)
Common law −0.0846
(−0.72)
Scandinavian civil law −0.504* −0.481** −0.520** −0.550** −0.361
(−2.38) (−2.63) (−2.93) (−2.95) (−1.53)
French civil law 0.0592
(0.50)
German civil law −0.271* −0.312*** −0.306*** −0.276*** −0.273*
(−2.28) (−3.88) (−3.93) (−3.41) (−2.19)
Democracy 0.211*
(2.44)
Autocracy −0.0307
(−0.25)
Consolidated democracy −0.0405
(−0.22)
Secular −0.0291
(−0.34)
Protestant −0.198
(−0.85)
Roman Catholic 0.153
(1.05)
Islamic 0.174
(1.40)
British dominion −0.0748 −0.107
(−0.37) (−0.64)
British colony −0.159 −0.178
(−1.72) (−1.93)
Ln. corporate stock value/GDP 0.133**
(2.87)
N 53 53 53 53 53 63 29
R2 0.870 0.828 0.835 0.865 0.869 0.866 0.870
instrumented lc lc lc
Excluded exogenous Common law, ln population
Weak id. statistic 20.70 16.60 14.83
Id. statistic (prob.) 10.52 (0.005) 8.782 (0.012) 9.336 (0.009)
Hansen’s J statistic (prob.) 1.108 (0.293) 0.703 (0.402) 1.195 (0.274)
Notes: Constants included but not reported. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
a Dependent variable includes Prados de la Escosura’s (‘Pre-independence Africa’) estimates of GDP.
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racy’ is combined with the two significant legal measures it ceases to be significant
(equation not tabulated).) Equation 7.4 instruments corporations, bringing down
the corporations’ elasticity a little from the OLS estimate.61 In equation 7.5 the
British dominion and colony variables are added but neither is a statistically
significant influence on GDP. Using the larger dataset, the only substantive change
is that the corporations’ elasticity of GDP rises and the negative effect of British
colonial status on GDP increases, but remains non-significant at the 5 per cent
level (equation 7.6).62 Replacing the company numbers with a company stock
value variable in the final (OLS) equation (7.7) gives greater weight to (more often
quoted) big firms than does the number of companies.63 Stock value to GDP yields
a rather higher elasticity of 0.13, with 29 observations, but finding suitable instru-
ments for the equation proved problematic. The most defensible estimate of the
effect of companies on income then is the elasticity of 0.095 in equation 7.4.That
is, an economy with double the number of corporations per capita of another
would have GDP per capita higher by 9.5 per cent, other things being equal.
For comparison with the 2SLS estimates of tables 5 to 7 we also estimated a
specification of the model by 3SLS (online appendix S2).64 This confirms the
overall qualitative conclusions that openness encouraged companies, as did higher
incomes. In the first equation, common law and Scandinavian law regimes were
highly conducive to a bigger stock of companies, but in British colonies (unlike
dominions) the common law effect was largely or completely offset by some other
characteristic. British colonies were unusually open but their coefficient in the
(second) export equation is no longer statistically significant in the slightly larger
sample, as in the 2SLS estimates of table 6. Consolidated democracies were the
opposite of the British colonies in their trade behaviour but, in contrast to the
2SLS results, the effects are not statistically significant.The third (GDP) equation
estimates a higher companies elasticity than equation 7.4 (0.14), and finds adverse
impacts of Scandinavian and German civil law systems but no significant effect for
British colonies. This implies that these colonies, in the smaller sample only,
experienced slightly higher GDPs than if they had not been colonies because of the
export boost to corporations (which may have been an administration effect)
operating through a larger stock of companies. By contrast the dominions received
a bigger lift from the common law system which was not offset by other admin-
istrative features. Extending the dataset with the three extra African economies
diminishes the significance of the export effect as with the 2SLS estimates, so it is
possible to maintain with this model that the colonial British Empire made no
gains as well as no losses for members. One interpretation of these results is that
the Asian colonies gained and the African colonies lost.
61 The diagnostics indicate these instruments are valid and relevant. The weak identification test (Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic) implies there is a less than 10% maximal IV size bias.
62 In both smaller and larger samples when the ‘independent poor country’ variable is introduced it is not
significantly different from the British colony coefficient (larger regression sample independents are Brazil, China,
Columbia, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Nepal).
63 In the US our measure is about 550% of NYSE capitalization (and 250% of all quoted firms), while in some
countries it is only 120% of stock market capitalization.
64 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS in that it uses information from the covariance matrix of disturbance terms,
but if one equation in the system is mis-specified, all the coefficients will be biased and inconsistent, whereas with
2SLS only the one equation is affected. Moreover, with 2SLS the instruments can be used more selectively, which
can be advantageous.
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The three equations of the model interact so that the effect on numbers of
companies (C), or through numbers of companies and openness to GDP per
capita (Y), of an exogenous variable such as common law is not identical to the
coefficient in the estimated equation. Since we have found that β1 = 0, the model
can be solved for companies and GDP in term of exogenous variables as below
(ignoring constants and control variables population and literacy);
C Z Z Z= + + +( )[ ] − +( )( )…α α β γ α β α γ α β α3 1 1 4 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 1 3 21 (4)
Y Z Z Z= + +[ ] − +( )( )…γ α γ α β γ γ α β α1 3 1 1 1 4 2 3 3 1 1 3 21 (5)
Z1 includes common and Scandinavian civil law,
65 Z2 includes consolidated
democracy,66 and Z3 includes Scandinavian and German civil law.
We have established that plausible values are γ1 = 0.095, α1 = 0.6, β3 = 1.5,
α2 = 1, and α3 = 0.8 for common law. Hence the common law effect on companies
is 0.8/0.819 = 0.98. Since C is in logs the effect is to raise company numbers by
(exp(.98)–1)*100 per cent = 166 per cent (table 8). But the number could be
larger given the variability of α3Z1 in table 5. The four institutional and political
regimes offer all possibilities of response to corporations and effects on them
(table 8). Common law regimes, as the bulk of the literature implies, were the most
favourable both to numbers of companies and to GDP per capita generated as a
consequence.Three of the six consolidated democracies also adhered to common
law. Table 8 shows that the common law system much more than offset their
economic disadvantage (which we attribute to special interest lobby power).
British dominions adopted common law regimes and therefore attained benefits
from empire through this channel. British colonies, however, do not seem to have
gained, nor did they do so through their export orientation, at least when sufficient
African colonies are included in the sample.The surprise is Scandinavian civil law
regimes which, controlling for their large numbers of companies, have lower
GDPs, perhaps because the companies were insufficiently regulated, the opposite
to German civil law regimes. Some Norwegian opinion believed that Norway
suffered from having no statutory company law because people (especially foreign
investors) were unsure of their legal standing. Indeed that was why Norway
introduced a corporate statute in 1910. Our estimated equation implies that
Scandinavian civil law administration put these countries approximately on a par
65 It also includes British colonies, but as we have noted, this effect is cancelled out by that of common law.
66 The ambiguity about the British colonies’ effect stemming from currently available small sample sizes here
warrants their exclusion from the following exercise for the moment.
Table 8. Contribution of institutional arrangements and political system to company
numbers and thereby to GDP per capita on the eve of the First World War
% change in company nos. % change in GDP per capita
Common law regime +166 +9.7
Scandinavian law regime +121 −42
German civil law regime −32 −29
Consolidated democracy −38 −4.5
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with (higher income) France. With four times as many companies Scandinavia
would have had a GDP per capita almost 40 per cent higher than France’s for this
reason, had it not been for some offset. The coefficient on Scandinavian civil law
pulls back Scandinavian GDP per capita to the level that would have been attained
without this negative coefficient but with French numbers of companies per
capita.
IV
This article has shown that the international spread of numbers of corporations in
1910 can be well explained by a few influences: GDP, legal regime, and export
intensity. For interpreting this last we adopt Rajan and Zingales’s hypothesis that
the extent of trade openness is an indication of administrative openness, and lack
of policy bias towards incumbent interest groups.67 We have extended Rajan and
Zingales’s conclusions for quoted companies to a larger range of countries, meas-
uring both quoted and unquoted companies before the First World War. Com-
bined listed and unlisted corporations on average promoted economic
development by their mobilization of capital. On average they were not captured
by fraudsters or incompetents so that the capital was stolen or wasted, as Gilbert
and Sullivan feared. This is consistent with corporations being an ‘inclusive’ or
‘good’ institution: their international spread by 1910 was associated with devel-
opment across much of the world.
Official religious adherence, or political systems, did not show the predicted
direct effects on corporatization in multivariate tests, because these factors are
highly correlated with the fundamental ones identified here: legal system, trade
openness, and level of development. However, we establish that it is not common,
in contrast to civil, law that matters for the international spread of companies, as
might be inferred from La Porta et al. 68 Instead we interpret the role of the
Scandinavian civil law and common law variables as reflecting liberal (laissez-faire)
industrial policies that allowed corporations to flourish, consistent with Musacchio
and Turner’s position.69 These groups of countries clearly gained substantially
from their politico-legal regimes, although Scandinavia would perhaps have ben-
efited from a less laissez-faire stance.Trade openness may have lowered predispo-
sitions, or reflected reduced tendencies, to protection of incumbent interests that
inhibited company formation. The consolidated democracy adverse impact on
exports is consistent with interest group capture, pursuing the Rajan and Zingales
approach, partly offsetting the effects of a liberal legal regime.This will have been
especially significant for the US, where so many of the world’s corporations were
to be found in 1910.
The explicit test of our version of the Accominotti et al. hypothesis concerning
the repressive effects of the dependent British Empire, in contrast to the settler
controlled British Empire, finds support from our analysis.70This is consistent with
colonies being more exploitative/less developmental than dominions in other areas
than company formation. Company law is a public good: almost non-excludable
67 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversals’.
68 La Porta et al., ‘Law and finance’.
69 Musacchio and Turner, ‘Law and finance hypothesis’.
70 Accominotti et al., ‘Black man’s burden’.
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and with low marginal costs per company after set-up.The extra costs of admitting
those of subordinate status to company law (as opposed to, say, educating them)
was small, and excluding or limiting them was apparently never contemplated by
Britain.71
The positive impact of corporatization in 1910 on GDP suggests that the
eventual massive expansion of the corporate form in both civil and common law
countries—corporate numbers multiplied about one-hundred-fold in the century
after our cross-section of 1910—was probably also growth-enhancing. Gilbert and
Sullivan were wrong: the World Bank and western triumphalists still draw less
audience applause, but—at least in this area—are nearer the mark.
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